# The Investment Behaviour of Small Investors in Stock Market: A Survey in Hong Kong 

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#### Abstract

This paper investigates the behaviour of small investors in the Hong Kong stock market. The survey's observation period covers the Chinese government "through train" program and sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2006-2008. The survey was conducted between October and November 2008. We attempt to identify and analyse the key factors that capture their behaviour in the Hong Kong stock market. The data were collected from 1,199 respondents via a questionnaire survey. Our study enhances our understanding of behavioural finance in the setting of an Asian financial centre, Hong Kong.


Keywords: Behavioural Finance, Small Investors, Stock Market, Hong Kong.

## 1. Introduction

On 13 April 2006, the Chinese government announced the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme, allowing Chinese institutions and residents to entrust Chinese commercial banks to invest in financial products overseas. However, at the time being, the scheme allowed individual investors to invest indirectly in overseas stock, through listed financial institutions in Hong Kong. All QDII funds launched to date are reporting losses, and the scheme appears to have lost its attraction for small investors. The sluggish overseas markets may also be a reason for Beijing shelving indefinitely the socalled "through train" program ${ }^{1}$ that allows individual

[^0]mainland Chinese residents to trade directly in Hong Kong stocks. Market investors became very excited. At the beginning, small investors were very interested in investing in the stock market in Hong Kong, and there was a significant increase in the Hang Seng index following the announcement. However, on 3 November 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao stated the need to carefully assess the possible adverse effects of the "through train" program on the stability of Hong Kong's financial system. Small investors then lost confidence in the program and sold their stock in the Hong Kong market, resulting in a significant decrease in the Hang Seng index.

The sub-prime mortgage crisis (2007-2010) was another issue that resulted in a loss of confidence among small investors in the stock market. Once the U.S. subprime crisis ${ }^{2}$ occurred, investors began to lose confidence in the collateralized securities, and their attempts to leave the market caused the liquidity crisis. Although many central banks tried to inject large amounts of funds into the financial market, they were unable to stop the financial crisis. In September 2008, the financial market began to get out of control; many firms and companies such as investment banks (e.g., Lehman Brothers) and insurance companies (e.g., American International Group) went bankrupt or were taken over by the government. In Hong Kong, many small investors lost money through their investment in Lehman mini bonds ${ }^{3}$. They also lost confidence in the Hong Kong market and sold their stock.

Beginning in January 2006, stock prices of companies

[^1][^2]experienced a phenomenal increase, followed by an abrupt downturn beginning at the end of October 2007. The Hang Seng index rose by $111.7 \%$ between January 2006 and the end of October 2007. By October 2008, the Hang Seng index had lost more than one-third of its market value compared to its peak in October 2007. This type of research is becoming increasingly important. Now that the costs of entering the stock market have fallen, more and more small investors are investing in stock. It is natural to wonder how well they are handling this type of investment. The objective of this study was to research the factors, investing characteristics, and decision-making processes that affected small investors during the buoyant stock market ${ }^{4}$ and the subsequent sharp correction period beginning at the end of October 2007. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical background; Section 3 explains the data and method; Section 4 discusses data analysis; and Section 5 contains the conclusion.

## 2. Theoretical Background

Behavioural finance is a new approach to financial markets that has emerged, at least in part, in response to the difficulties faced by the traditional paradigm. It seeks to understand and predict systematic financial market implications of the psychological decision processes.

Did small investors change their investment behaviour during and immediately after the buoyant stock market of January 2006 to October 2007 in Hong Kong? If so, how did their investment behaviour change? This section will briefly examine the existing literature, in order to address this question.

A man could be judged irrational either because his preferences are contradictory or because his desires and aversions do not reflect his pleasures and pains (Tversky, Kahneman, 1981). Prospect theory is a mathematically formulated alternative to the theory of expected utility maximization. Kahneman and Tversky ${ }^{5}$ (1979) laid out the

[^3]original version of prospect theory. Their paper presented a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision-making under risk, and developed an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people give less credence to outcomes that are probable, versus outcomes that are certain. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion when making choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking when making choices involving sure losses.

We saw how prospect theory could explain why people make different choices in situations with identical financial wealth levels. This illustrates an important feature of prospect theory, namely that it can accommodate the effects of problem description, or framing. Framing refers to the way a problem is posed for the decision-maker. In many choice contexts the decision-maker has flexibility in how to think about the problem. One important feature of mental accounting is narrow framing, which is the tendency to treat individual gambles separately from other portions of wealth. In other words, when offered a gamble, people often evaluate it as if it is the only gamble they face in the world, rather than merging it with preexisting bets to see if the new bet is a worthwhile addition (Barberis, Thaler, 2003, p.1071). People sometimes separate decisions that should, in principle, be combined. For example, many people have a household budget for food, and a household budget for entertaining. When eating at home (covered by the food budget), they will not eat lobster or shrimp because they are much more expensive than a simple fish casserole. But in a restaurant (covered by the entertaining budget), they will order lobster and shrimp, even though the cost is much higher than a more simple fish casserole. If they instead ate lobster and shrimp at home, and the simple fish casserole in a restaurant, they could save money. But because they think separately about restaurant meals and food at home, they choose to limit their food at home (Ritter, 2003).

Cognitive dissonance is the mental conflict that people experience when they are presented with evidence that their beliefs or assumptions are wrong; as such, cognitive dissonance might be classified as a sort of pain of regret, or regret over mistaken beliefs. The theory of cognitive

Amos Tversky had died by that time and did not share in the fame.
dissonance asserts that there is a tendency for people to take actions to reduce cognitive dissonance that would not normally be considered fully rational: the person may avoid the new information or develop contorted arguments to maintain their beliefs or assumptions (Shiller, 2001). Cognitive resource constraints force the use of heuristics to make decisions, which Hirshleifer (2001) called heuristic simplification (for cognitive resource constraints, this means limited attention, processing power and memory.)

A source of bias arises indirectly from cognitive constraints. Natural selection probably did not design human minds solely to make good decisions. In the availability heuristic, items that are easier to recall are judged to be more common. This generally makes sense, since things that are more common are noticed or reported more often, making them easier to remember. Regular Web users can think of examples relating to the Internet revolution, which encouraged the market boom of the late 1990s. The representative heuristic (Tversky, Kahneman, 1974) involves assessing the probability of a state of the world, based on the degree to which the evidence is perceived as similar to or typical of that state. People's perceptions of how "representative" a piece of evidence is of a state may poorly match its conditional probability of the evidence. Companies with very low P/E's (Price-earnings ratio) are thought to be temporarily "undervalued", because investors become overly pessimistic after a series of bad earning reports or other bad news. Once future earnings turn out to be better than the unreasonably gloomy forecasts, the price adjusts. Similarly, the equity of companies with high P/E's is thought to be "overvalued," before (predictably) falling in price (De Bondt, Thaler, 1985).

Overconfidence implies over-optimism about the individual's ability to succeed in his endeavours. Economists have long asked whether investors who misperceive asset returns can survive in a competitive asset market such as a stock or a currency market. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, Waldmann (1991) concluded that there is, in fact, a presumption that overconfident investors-even grossly overconfident investors-will tend to control a higher proportion of the wealth invested in securities markets as time passes. Kyle, Wang (1997) showed that overconfidence may strictly dominate rationality, since an overconfident trader may not only generate higher expected profit and utility than his rational opponent, but will also generate more profit than he would have if he was a rational investor. Odean (1998)
found that people are overconfident. His paper examined markets in which price-taking traders, a strategic-trading insider, and risk-averse market-makers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Benos (1998) studied an extreme form of posterior overconfidence where some risk-neutral investors overestimated the precision of their private information. The participation of overconfident traders in the market led to higher transaction volumes and more volatility .Odean (1999) presented data on individual trading behaviour, which suggests that extremely high volumes may be driven, in part, by overconfidence on the part of investors. Overconfidence can explain high trading levels and the resulting poor performance of individual investors (Barber, Odean, 2000).

In many situations, people make estimates by starting with an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the result of a partial computation. In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient; i.e., different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We call this phenomenon anchoring (Tversky, Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring refers to the decisionmaking process where quantitative assessments are required and where these assessments may be influenced by suggestions. People have in their minds some reference points (anchors), such as previous stock prices. When they receive new information they adjust these reference points insufficiently (under-reaction) to the newly acquired information. Anchoring describes how individuals tend to focus on recent behaviour and give less weight to longer time trends.

Herding is closely linked to impact expectations, fickle changes without new information, bubbles, fads, or frenzies. However, herding does require a coordination mechanism. This mechanism could be widespread rule to coordinate based on some signal (e.g. price movement), or be based on an individual's direct ability to observe other decision-makers (observing investment trends) (Salmon, 2001).

## 3. Data and Method

The theories and literature written on behavioural finance are relatively new. In this study, we have endeavoured to
take an objective perspective on behavioural finance while describing and utilizing existing theories in explaining the change in the behaviour of small investors during and immediately after the buoyant stock market.

In our study, secondary data were not available to facilitate our research. Our study data were collected primarily through a survey questionnaire directed (face-to-face) at small investors. Since the majority of Hong Kong's population is Cantonese-speaking, the original questionnaire was written in Chinese. Subsequent amendments ${ }^{6}$ to the questionnaire were made following a pilot test on ten respondents. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1. The small investors to be interviewed were selected using non-probability sampling ${ }^{7}$ during October to November 2008. There were 1,199 selected respondents who were successfully interviewed.

The survey questionnaire was designed to elicit information about demographics and the situation and factors affecting financial decision-making. We took an existing questionnaire developed by Lund University ${ }^{8}$ in Sweden and modified it for this study. The first part of questionnaire focused on the situation and factors affecting financial decision-making. The second part collected respondents' personal information, including gender, age, employment status and personal average monthly income.

## 4. Data Analysis

At the end of the survey period, a total of 1,199 questionnaires were returned. Since some respondents did not reply to all the questions in the questionnaire, we only used the number of replies (i.e., the questions that respondents did not answer were not counted) to calculate the total number of and the percentage of the total for the individual entries.

### 4.1 Preliminary Survey Results

Table 1 shows that $44.5 \%$ of respondents were female and $55.4 \%$ were male. The majority of respondents were

[^4]between the ages of 26 and 64 ( $64.8 \%$ ), while $33.1 \%$ were below age 25 and $2.1 \%$ were over age 65 . For the employment status aspect, $64.9 \%$ of respondents reported being employed, $10.3 \%$ were "self-employed", $6.7 \%$ were retired and $18.2 \%$ were classified as "Others" (e.g., housewives, students, etc.).

### 4.2 Data Analysis

In this section, based on the information contained in Tables 1-4 and Figures 1-5, we attempt to examine the income distribution, the long-term and short-term investment horizon, the behavioural characteristics, and the prospect theory and heuristics of small investors in the Hong Kong stock market. The sharp correction in the stock market from the end of October 2007 may have caused the aversion of small investors to making longterm investments. A more comprehensive result could be achieved by asking whether small investors have changed their investment behaviour (and how they distributed their investments between short- and long-term) today compared with the period before the market decline at the end of October 2007.

### 4.2.1 Income Distribution

Based on the information contained in Table 2, the respondents' mean individual income was $\$ 14,564.22^{9}$, and the median individual income was $\$ 12,033.58^{10}$.

### 4.2.2 Long-Term and Short-Term Investment Horizon

The results from Question 1a indicate that both female and male respondents had invested between $70 \%$ and $80 \%$ of their capital on long-term investments covering a period over five years (see Figure 1). The results from question 1 b indicate that both female and male respondents had invested between $30 \%$ and $40 \%$ of their capital on shortterm investments of under a year (see Figure 2). These results indicate a preference for long-term investments, which may be a result, in part, of the buoyant stock market from January 2006 to the end of October 2007,

[^5]Table 1: Results of Small Investors' Behaviour on Stock Market in Hong Kong

| Items |  | No. | \% of Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (A) Situation and factors affecting financial decision making |  |  |  |
| 1. | Do you monitor your investments with a short-term investment horizon more often today compared with the period before the market decline at the end of October 2007. Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | Yes | 413 | 34.4 |
|  | No | 222 | 18.5 |
|  | The same | 448 | 37.4 |
|  | Cannot say | 116 | 9.7 |
| 2. | Do you monitor your investments with a long-term investment horizon more often today compared with period before the market decline at the end of October 2007. Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | Yes | 383 | 31.9 |
|  | No | 152 | 12.7 |
|  | The same | 566 | 47.2 |
|  | Cannot say | 96 | 8.0 |
| 3. | During the increases in equity prices from January 2006 up to the end of October 2007, did you at any point in time think that you could forecast the future market development? |  |  |
|  | Yes | 336 | 28.0 |
|  | No | 490 | 40.9 |
|  | Cannot say | 369 | 30.8 |
| 4. | During the increases in equity prices from January 2006 up to the end of October 2007, how did you react to announcements and other information from companies? Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | I made changes in my portfolio after the first news announcements | 182 | 15.2 |
|  | I made changes in my portfolio after a number of consequent news announcements that pointed into the same direction | 465 | 38.8 |
|  | I was not concerned about news announcements | 393 | 32.2 |
|  | I cannot say | 158 | 13.2 |
| 5. | When making investment decisions today, which of the following factors do you consider most important when making investments? Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | Information from the company as a basis for a fundamental analysis. | 303 | 25.3 |
|  | Recommendations, advice and forecasts from professional investors. | 221 | 18.4 |
|  | The overall past performance of the market seen from a historical perspective. | 301 | 25.1 |
|  | Information from newspapers / TV. | 113 | 9.4 |
|  | Information from the Internet. | 47 | 3.9 |
|  | Discussion with personal friends. | 85 | 7.1 |
|  | Information from colleagues at work. | 30 | 2.5 |
|  | Own intuition of future performance. | 99 | 8.3 |
| 6. | When you made investment decisions during the period from January 2006 to the end of October 2007, which of the following factors did you consider most important when making decision. Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | Information from the company as a basis for a fundamental analysis. | 242 | 20.2 |
|  | Recommendations, advice and forecasts from professional investors. | 265 | 22.1 |
|  | The overall past performance of the market seen from a historical perspective. | 287 | 23.9 |
|  | Information from newspapers / TV. | 125 | 10.4 |
|  | Information from the Internet. | 58 | 4.8 |
|  | Discussion with personal friends. | 89 | 7.4 |
|  | Information from colleagues at work. | 38 | 3.2 |
|  | Own intuition of future performance. | 95 | 7.9 |


| Items |  | No. | \% of Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7. | In your opinion, was the stock market overvalued at any point of time during the period from January 2006 to the end of October 2007? |  |  |
|  | Yes (to question10) | 678 | 56.5 |
|  | No (jump to question11) | 181 | 15.1 |
|  | Cannot say (jump to question11) | 337 | 28.1 |
| 8. | If yes, what do you think was the most important contributing factor to the overvaluation of the market during the period from January 2006 to the end of October 2007? Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | The news stories in the media. | 55 | 4.6 |
|  | The forecasts of analysts. | 66 | 5.5 |
|  | Overconfidence among investors in the stock market. | 168 | 14.0 |
|  | Earnings and profitability of the listed companies. | 45 | 3.8 |
|  | Herd behaviour, i.e. small investors following the majority. | 343 | 28.6 |
| 9. | What do you think was the most important contributing factor to the decline in the market from the end of October 2007 up until today? Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | The news stories in the media. | 120 | 10.0 |
|  | The forecasts of analysts. | 95 | 7.9 |
|  | Loss of confidence among investors in the stock market. | 391 | 32.6 |
|  | Earnings and profitability of the listed companies. | 214 | 17.8 |
|  | Herd behaviour, i.e. small investors following the majority. | 294 | 24.5 |
| 10. | Using the scale provided ( 1 to 5 ) if there was a similar significant downturn in the market today as there was beginning at the end of October 2007, the market will surely be back up to its former levels in a couple of years or so? |  |  |
|  | Strongly disagree Strongly agree |  |  |
|  | $\begin{array}{lllll}1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5\end{array}$ |  |  |
|  | Items No. \% to Total |  |  |
|  | 103 |  |  |
|  | 2 294 - 24.5 |  |  |
|  | 3 462 - 38.5 |  |  |
|  | 4 l |  |  |
|  | 582 |  |  |
| 11. | According to you, what is generally the reason for your less successful investments? Choose one alternative: |  |  |
|  | Incorrect recommendations or advice from broker/analyst/ banker etc. | 151 | 12.6 |
|  | Incorrect recommendations or advice from other sources | 161 | 13.4 |
|  | The market has, in general, performed poorly | 460 | 38.4 |
|  | Own errors | 404 | 33.7 |
|  | Others (please specify): | 22 | 1.8 |

12. You are faced with the following situation: A stock you bought one month ago for $\$ 50$ is selling today at $\$ 40$. One month from now the stock price will have either increased in price by $\$ 10$ (i.e. price one month from now will be $\$ 50$ ) or decreased in price by $\$ 10$ (i.e. price one month from now will be $\$ 30$ ). Both possibilities are equally likely; fifty-fifty chance. Choose one from the following:
Sell the stock now, thereby realizing a $\$ 10$ loss.
Hold the stock for one more month, given 50-50 odds between losing an additional $\$ 10$ or break-

| 372 | 31.0 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 824 | 68.7 | ing even.

13. Assume the following situation: during the two recent years, the stock price of a certain company has risen with $70 \%$ and even the future for the stock looks bright. How do you value this information? Choose one alternative:
The stock is worth buying.
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| Items | No. of Total |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | The information is not sufficient enough for buying the stock. | 800 | 66.7 |
|  | The stock is not worth buying. | 181 | 15.1 |
|  | (B) Demographic Characteristics |  |  |
| 14. | Gender: |  |  |
|  | Female | 534 | 44.5 |
|  | Male | 664 | 55.4 |
| 15. | Please choose your relevant age group: |  |  |
|  | under 25 years old | 397 | 33.1 |
|  | $26-35$ years old | 297 | 24.8 |
|  | $36-50$ years old | 332 | 27.7 |
|  | $51-65$ years old | 148 | 12.3 |
| 16. | Employment status: | 25 | 2.1 |
|  | Employee | 778 | 64.9 |
|  | Self-employed | 123 | 10.3 |
|  | Retired | 80 | 6.7 |
|  | Others (please specify): | 218 | 18.2 |
| 17. | Your average monthly income (including salaries, interest, rent and other earnings): |  |  |
|  | Below HK\$5,000 | 265 | 22.1 |
|  | HK\$5,000 -HK\$9,999 | 226 | 18.8 |
|  | HK\$10,000 - HK\$14,999 | 268 | 22.4 |
|  | HK\$15,000 - HK\$19,999 | 193 | 16.1 |
|  | HK\$20,000 - HK\$24,999 | 117 | 9.8 |
|  | HK\$25,000 - HK\$29,999 | 46 | 3.8 |
|  | HK\$50,000 or above | 52 | 4.3 |
|  | 32 | 2.7 |  |

which was characterized by the "through train" program, and speculative and short-term investments. The end of the "through train" program may have caused the current aversion towards these types of investments. Since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, small investors have lost confidence in those types of collateralized securities and have tried to escape from the market. The result is that small investors may feel more comfortable investing in more safe and long-term investments.

### 4.3 Behavioural Characteristics

## Change in Monitoring of Investments

To determine whether small investors paid more attention to their investments after the market began to decline, respondents were asked two questions (Questions 2 and 3) on whether they monitored both their short-term
investments and long-term investments more often after the market decline.

Table 1 shows the frequency of respondents monitoring their short-term investments today compared with the period before the market decline at the end of October 2007 (Question 2). The highest number of respondents (37.4\%) have not changed their behaviour regarding the monitoring of their short-term investments. Similar results were found for monitoring of long-term investments (Question 3), as $47.2 \%$ of respondents did not change their monitoring behaviour. Most of the respondents have not changed their monitoring behaviour because the market decline has made them more cautious.

## Change in Investment Target Categories

To determine whether the small investors changed their investment objectives as a result of the market

Table 2: Respondents' Average Monthly Income Distribution

| Class boundaries | Class mid-point | Frequency | Cumulative frequency | Class Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\$ 0$ and under $\$ 5,000$ | 2,500 | 265 | 265 | $\$ 662,500$ |
| $\$ 5,000$ and under $\$ 10,000$ | 7,500 | 226 | 491 | $\$ 1,695,000$ |
| $\$ 10,000$ and under $\$ 15,000$ | 12,500 | 268 | 759 | $\$ 3,350,000$ |
| $\$ 15,000$ and under $\$ 20,000$ | 17,500 | 193 | 952 | $\$ 3,377,500$ |
| $\$ 20,000$ and under $\$ 25,000$ | 22,500 | 117 | 1,069 | $\$ 2,632,500$ |
| $\$ 25,000$ and under $\$ 30,000$ | 27,500 | 46 | 1,115 | $\$ 1,265,000$ |
| $\$ 30,000$ and under $\$ 50,000$ | 40,000 | 52 | 1,167 | $\$ 2,080,000$ |
| $\$ 50,000$ and under $\$ 100,000$ | 75,000 | 32 | 1,199 | $\$ 2,400,000$ |
| Total |  | 1,199 |  | $\$ 17,462,500$ |

Figure 1: Proportion of Investments with Long-Term (>5 year.) Investment Horizon (\%)

decline, respondents were asked to choose between two alternatives that best describe the investments they made in the two different time periods studied (Questions 4 and 12): the period from January 2006 up to the market decline at the end of October 2007 and the period at the end of October 2007 up until today.

Table 3 shows the investment target categories chosen by respondents before the market decline. The results show that $30.75 \%$ of females and $30.21 \%$ of males invested mainly in large size companies. In addition, 27.74\% of females and $23.72 \%$ of males invested mainly in
companies with stable but lower expected returns.
Table 4 shows the investment target categories chosen by respondents after the market decline. The results showed that large size companies and companies with stable but lower expected returns were still the favourite investment categories after the decline: $36.78 \%$ of females and $34.25 \%$ of males invested in large size companies and $34.71 \%$ of females and $32.57 \%$ of males invested in companies with stable but lower expected returns. In fact, the proportion of those investing in these two target categories increased by a wide margin: investment in companies with stable

Figure 2: Proportion of Investments with Short-Term (<1 year.) Investment Horizon (\%)

but lower expected returns increased from $27.74 \%$ to $34.71 \%$ for females and $23.72 \%$ to $32.57 \%$ for males, and investment in large size companies increased from $30.75 \%$ to $36.78 \%$ for females and $30.21 \%$ to $34.25 \%$ for males. Investment in companies with uncertain but higher expected returns and investment in IPO (Initial Public Offering) decreased after the decline: investment in the former dropped from $13.21 \%$ to $7.53 \%$ for females and $16.39 \%$ to $11.49 \%$ for males, while investment in the latter dropped from $20.47 \%$ to $13.26 \%$ for females and $17.46 \%$ to $11.11 \%$ for males.

The domination of the investment target categories "companies with stable but lower expected returns" and "large size companies" both before and after the market decline shows that investment target categories with smaller risk fit human nature; in other words, people will always try to minimize and diversify their risks by investing in both safe and risky investments. However, after the market decline, small investors were discouraged from making high-risk investments. They became more sensitive to loss; therefore, they invested more in "safe" investments and less in "risky" investments.

We reviewed the results by gender, to determine whether any investment characteristics are gender-based. We found out that although both females and males were mostly unwilling to make high-risk investment decisions (shown in the high proportion of respondents who invested in less risky investment target categories), males were more willing to take some risk, shown in the larger proportion of males who reported investing in "companies with uncertain but higher expected returns". Before the market decline, $16.39 \%$ of males invested in this category, compared to $13.21 \%$ of females. Even after the market decline, males were still more likely to invest in the higher risk categories: $11.49 \%$ of males and $7.53 \%$ of females invested in the companies with uncertain but higher expected returns. Therefore, we may conclude that when deciding on the type of investment, females are generally more prudent while males are more adventurous.

## Change in Factors Important for Investments

Which factors do investors consider to be the most important when making their investment decisions? Respondents were asked to rate the importance of factors

Table 3: Investment Target Category (revealed by Question 4)

| Gender |  | Female (\%) | Male (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Companies with uncertain but higher expected returns | 13.21 | 16.39 |
| O | Companies with stable but lower expected returns | 27.74 | 23.72 |
| $\stackrel{\square}{0}$ | Large size companies | 30.75 | 30.21 |
| $\stackrel{\square}{J}$ | Small size companies | 3.87 | 5.21 |
| O | IPO | 20.47 | 17.46 |
| $\stackrel{0}{0}$ | Derivatives | 3.96 | 6.8 |
| ヨ | Total | 100 | 99.79 |

Table 4: Investment Target Category (revealed by Question 12)

|  | Gender | Female (\%) | Male (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 000000000$\pm$000003 | Companies with uncertain but higher expected returns | 7.53 | 11.49 |
|  | Companies with stable but lower expected returns | 34.71 | 32.57 |
|  | Large size companies | 36.78 | 34.25 |
|  | Small size companies | 3.2 | 4.72 |
|  | IPO | 13.26 | 11.11 |
|  | Derivatives | 4.52 | 5.86 |
|  | Total | 100 | 100 |

influencing investment decisions (Questions 7 and 8 in Table 1). We can see that the overall past performance of the market was the most important factor affecting investment decisions between January 2006 and October 2007, with $23.9 \%$ of respondents choosing this factor. Advice from professionals was the next important factor chosen by $22.1 \%$ of respondents, followed by receiving information from the company, at $20.2 \%$.

The most important factor affecting current investment decisions is receiving information from the company ( $25.3 \%$ of respondents), closely followed by the overall past performance of the market ( $25.1 \%$ of respondents). The results show that since the decline of the market, small investors pay more attention to these types of factors in order to help them analyze which stock is worth buying, as these factors focus on clear facts and fundamental valuations. The importance of receiving advice from professionals has decreased since the market decline, possibly due to a loss of confidence in these professionals. Overall, it appears that small investors now prefer to make investment decisions on their own.

Possible Reasons for the Overvaluation and Decline of the Market

According to the survey results from Question 9 in Table 1, $56.5 \%$ of respondents considered the market to be overvalued between January 2006 and the end of October 2007, while $15.1 \%$ did not consider the market to be overvalued, and $28.1 \%$ of respondents could not decide. Even though small investors were confronted with evidence suggesting that the consecutive price increases in the market did not have any fundamental basis, and thus the market was overvalued, they may have avoided this new information or developed contorted arguments to maintain their own beliefs.

What factors contributed to the overvaluation of the market during the period from January 2006 to the end of October 2007? According to the survey results from Question 10 in Table 1, the most important factor reported by respondents was herd behaviour ( $28.6 \%$ ), followed by overconfidence among investors in the market ( $14 \%$ ).

With regard to the factors contributing to the decline in the market starting at the end of October 2007 (Question 11 in Table 1), $32.6 \%$ of respondents indicated that loss of confidence was the most important factor, followed by herd behaviour (24.5\%).

What are the possible reasons given by small investors to explain their less successful investments? Results from Question 14 in Table 1 show that $38.4 \%$ of respondents considered the poor performance of the market to be the most important factor leading to their less successful investments, followed by their own errors ( $33.7 \%$ ). The failure of investments brings with it feeling of regret, and it is possible that small investors may have attempted to avoid this feeling by blaming their poor investment performance on an external cause (poor performance of the market), rather than an internal one (their own errors).

### 4.4 Prospect Theory

## Susceptibility to Loss Aversion When Faced with Losses

Would small investors prefer to gamble and possibly accumulate further losses when faced with a price decline of their stock, instead of closing their position with a minor loss? Question 15 in Table 1 was used to explore this question. Results show that a majority of respondents would choose to hold onto the stock for one more month, in the hope that it would break even ( $68.7 \%$ of respondents). In contrast, only $31.0 \%$ of respondents would sell the stock now thereby realizing a $\$ 10$ loss. This result is reasonable, as if there is a chance to break even or possibly gain capital, most people would take that chance. In particular, people give less credence to outcomes that are probable, versus outcomes that are certain. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion when making choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking when making choices involving sure losses.

### 4.5 Heuristics

## Investors' Ability to Forecast the Development of the Market

During the increases in equity price from January 2006 up to the end of October 2007, did small investors at any point in time think that they could forecast future market development? The purpose of this question was to establish if there was a degree of overconfidence among small investors between January 2006 and the end of October 2007. The results (shown in Question 5 in Table 1) show that $40.9 \%$ of respondents did not think they could forecast future market development, compared to $28.0 \%$
of respondents who believed they could. Thus, there was a small group of respondents who were as confident in their own forecasting skills as the professionals.

## Investing in a Winner Stock

Assume that in the last two years, the stock price of a certain company rose $70 \%$, and the future for the stock looks good. How do small investors value this information? Question 16 was used to determine whether small investors would make investment decisions based only on observed similarities to familiar patterns. The results, in Table 1, show that a majority of respondents felt there was not sufficient information to make a decision to purchase the stock ( $67.7 \%$ ), while $18.1 \%$ of respondents thought the stock was worth buying. Only $15.1 \%$ of respondents thought the stock was not worth buying. It is possible that the prudence shown by the respondents in this question may be a result of their loss of confidence in the market.

## Probability for Continued Changes in Value

How do small investors perceive the probability of repeated events and how do they react to a similar occurrence taking place in the market? Questions 17 and 18 refer to the anchoring of decisions to previous events when faced with uncertainty, and describe a situation where the index of a stock market has decreased or increased for three days in a row. Figures 3 and 4 show that approximately $35 \%$ of respondents thought there was a $50-60 \%$ probability that the market would increase if the Hang Seng Index increased for three consecutive days; on the other hand, approximately $40 \%$ of respondents thought there was a $50-60 \%$ probability that the market would decrease if the Hang Seng Index decreased for three consecutive days.

## Forecast of the Hang Seng Index

If the Hang Seng Index was at 18,000 points today, what do small investors think the index will be at in 6 months? The answer to this question (Question 20) looks at the level of confidence small investors have in the stock market. The results, seen in Figure 5, show that the respondents are prudent: most respondents forecast that the market level would not be that high-between 20,000 and under 21,000 points. This means that they believe the market will not recover so quickly, even though the forecast is that the Hang Seng Index will recover within 6 months to the level before the market decline.

Figure 3: If Hang Seng Index has Increased Consecutively During the past three days, what is Probability That it Will Increase in Value During Tomorrow as well


Figure 4: If the Hang Seng Index has Decreased Consecutively During the Past Three days, what is Probability That it Will Decrease in Value During Tomorrow as Well


Figure 5: If the Hang Seng Index was 18,000 Today, what do you Think the Index will be in 6 Months?


## 5. Conclusion

The objective of this paper was to research the factors and decision-making processes that affect the investment behaviour of small investors. There was a change in the behaviour of small investors' during and immediately after the buoyant stock market of January 2006 to October 2007 in Hong Kong. During the buoyant market, small investors were overconfident and bought stock. The small investors also exhibited herd behaviour, and, once the sharp correction to the market began after October 2007, they sold the stock. The small investors had in mind some reference points (anchors), such as the stock purchase price. If a stock appreciates (e.g., during the buoyant stock market) and the small investor continues to use purchase price as a reference point, the stock price will be in a more concave, risk-averse part of the investor's value function. The stock's expected return may continue to justify its risk, but if the small investor lowers her expectation somewhat for the stock's return, she will likely sell the stock. On the other hand, if the stock declines (e.g., immediately after the buoyant stock market), its price is the convex, riskseeking part of the value function. Here the small investor will continue to hold the stock even if its expected return falls lower than the level that would have been necessary to justify its original purchase.
|

Specifically, the objective of this paper was to study the reasons that lay behind the enormous rise in the value of the stock market in Hong Kong between January 2006 and October 2007. The survey results showed that a majority of small investors have an investment horizon of more than five years. Furthermore, the unpleasant experience of the market decline after October 2007 has made small investors more cautious and careful now than they were during the buoyant stock market.

When we examined the reasons that contributed to the buoyant stock market, the results were more scattered. The overall past performance of the market was the most important factor affecting investment decisions for small investors during the period of January 2006 to October 2007 ( $23.9 \%$ of respondents chose this factor). In contrast, the most important factor affecting current investment decisions was receiving information from the company ( $25.3 \%$ of respondents). With regard to the factor that contributed most to overvaluation of the market, $28.6 \%$ of respondents chose herd behaviour. Finally, $32.6 \%$ of respondents indicated that loss of confidence was the most important factor that contributed to the market decline after October 2007.

Prospect theory and heuristics may help to further explain the other psychological factors affecting the investment decision-making process and how these processes can
lead to a buoyant stock market. Prospect theory asserts that people are risk seekers for losses and risk averse only for levels of wealth above a certain reference point. This was true among the small investors in Hong Kong. Heuristics - a process by which people find out things for themselves, usually by trial and error-may help to explain why the market sometimes acts in a less-thanrational manner. In our study, the heuristic-related factor of overconfidence in the market was the second most important contributing factor to the overvaluation of the market between January 2006 and the end of October 2007 ( $14 \%$ of respondents chose this factor). During the buoyant stock market, overconfidence appears to have been strong among small investors. This suggests that small investors' decision-making was influenced by a strong belief in their own skills, which can lead to an underestimation of the likelihood of bad outcomes during a buoyant stock market.

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## Appendix 1

No: $\qquad$
A survey on the change of small investors' behaviour in the Hong Kong stock market

| Target Population: | Hong Kong small investors on stock market (Non-probability sampling) |
| :--- | :--- |
| The Purpose: | To collect the information and opinion of Hong Kong small investor who invest in stocks. Deeply <br> investigate of Hong Kong small investors' financial decision making. More specifically, we are <br> researching how the speculative market during January 2006 and at the end of October 2007 has <br> affected investment behaviour. With the speculative market we mean the significant increase in eq- <br> uity prices from January 2006 up to the end of October 2007. We are also researching how market <br> participants have changed their market behaviour after the sharp correction in the market during the <br> period from the end of October 2007 up until today. |
| Duration of the Survey: | October - November 2008 |

(A) Situation and factors affecting financial decision making

1. How your investments are distributed between short-term and long-term investment horizons:
a. Proportion of investments with long-term ( $>5 \mathrm{yr}$.) investment horizon__ $\%$
b. Proportion of investments with short-term ( $<1$ yr. ) investment horizon $\qquad$ \%
2. Do you monitor your investments with a short-term investment horizon more often today compared with the period before the market decline at the end of October 2007. Choose one alternative:

- Yes
- No
- The same
- Cannot say

3. Do you monitor your investments with a long-term investment horizon more often today compared with period before the market decline at the end of October 2007. Choose one alternative:

- Yes
- No
- The same
- Cannot say

4. Choose the two alternatives that best describe your investment strategies during the period from January 2006 up to the market decline at the end of October 2007.

- I invested mostly in companies with uncertain, but higher expected returns
- I invested mostly in companies with stable, but lower expected returns
- I invested mostly in large size companies
- I invested mostly in small size companies
- I invested mostly in IPO (Initial Public Offering)
- I invested mostly in derivatives

5. During the increases in equity prices from January 2006 up to the end of October 2007, did you at any point in time think that you could forecast the future market development?
— - 效

- No
- Cannot say

6. During the increases in equity prices from January 2006 up to the end of October 2007, how did you react to announcements and other information from companies? Choose one alternative:

- I made changes in my portfolio after the first news announcements
- I made changes in my portfolio after a number of consequent news announcements that pointed into the same direction
- I was not concerned about news announcements
- I cannot say

7. When making investment decisions today, which of the following factors do you consider most important when making investments? Choose one alternative:

- Information from the company as a basis for a fundamental analysis.
- Recommendations, advice and forecasts from professional investors.
- The overall past performance of the market seen from a historical perspective.
- Information from newspapers / TV.
- Information from the Internet.
- Discussion with personal friends.
- Information from colleagues at work.
- Own intuition of future performance.

8. When you made investment decisions during the period from January 2006 to the end of October 2007, which of the following factors did you consider most important when making decision. Choose one alternative:

- Information from the company as a basis for a fundamental analysis.
- Recommendations, advice and forecasts from professional investors.
- The overall past performance of the market seen from a historical perspective.
- Information from newspapers / TV.
- Information from the Internet.
- Discussion with personal friends.
- Information from colleagues at work.
- Own intuition of future performance.

9. In your opinion, was the stock market overvalued at any point of time during the period from January 2006 to the end of October 2007?

- Yes (to question10)
- No (jump to question11)
- Cannot say (jump to question11)

10. If yes, what do you think was the most important contributing factor to the overvaluation of the market during the period from January 2006 to the end of October 2007? Choose one alternative:

- The news stories in the media.
- The forecasts of analysts.
- Over-confidence among investors in the stock market.
- Earnings and profitability of the listed companies.
- Herd behaviour, i.e. small investors following the majority.

11. What do you think was the most important contributing factor to the decline in the market from the end of October 2007 up until today? Choose one alternative:

- The news stories in the media.
- The forecasts of analysts.
- Loss of confidence among investors in the stock market.
- Earnings and profitability of the listed companies.
- Herd behaviour, i.e. small investors following the majority.

12. Choose two alternatives that best describe the investments you have been making since the market decline at the end of October 2007 up until today.

- I invested mostly in companies with uncertain, but higher expected returns
- I invested mostly in companies with stable, but lower expected return
- I invested mostly in large size companies
- I invested mostly in small size companies
- I invested mostly in IPO (Initial Public Offering)
- I invested mostly in derivatives

13. Using the scale provided (1 to 5) if there was a similar significant downturn in the market today as there was beginning at the end of October 2007, the market will surely be back up to its former levels in a couple of years or so?

| Strongly disagree <-------------> Strongly agree |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

14. According to you, what is generally the reason for your less successful investments?

Choose one alternative:

- Incorrect recommendations or advice from broker/analyst/banker etc.
- Incorrect recommendations or advice from other sources
- The market has, in general, performed poorly
- Own errors
- Others (please specify): $\qquad$

15. You are faced with the following situation: A stock you bought one month ago for $\$ 50$ is selling today at $\$ 40$. One month from now the stock price will have either increased in price by $\$ 10$ (i.e. price one month from now will be $\$ 50$ ) or decreased in price by $\$ 10$ (i.e. price one month from now will be $\$ 30$ ). Both possibilities are equally likely; fifty-fifty chance. Choose one from the following:

- Sell the stock now, thereby realizing a $\$ 10$ loss.
- Hold the stock for one more month, given 50-50 odds between losing an additional $\$ 10$ or breaking even.

16. Assume the following situation: during the two recent years, the stock price of a certain company has risen with $70 \%$ and even the future for the stock looks bright. How do you value this information? Choose one alternative:

- The stock is worth buying.
- The information is not sufficient enough for buying the stock.
- The stock is not worth buying.

17. If the Hang Seng Index has increased consecutively during the past three days what is probability that it will increase in value during tomorrow as well? (From 0-100\%)

- $\qquad$ \%

18. If the Hang Seng Index has decreased consecutively during the past three days what is probability that it will decrease in value during tomorrow as well? (From 0-100\%)

- $\qquad$ \%

19. If you look at the stock market today, in your opinion, it is (choose one alternative):

- Overvalued by $\qquad$ \%
- Undervalued by $\qquad$ $\%$
- Value at a fundamentally correct level.
- Cannot say.

20. If the Hang Seng Index was 18,000 points today, what do you think the index will be in 6 months? I think the Hang Seng Index will be $\qquad$ points in 6 months.
(B) Demographic Characteristics
21. Gender:

- Female
- Male

22. Please choose your relevant age group:

- under 25 years old
- 26-35 years old
- 36-50 years old
- 51-65 years old
- over 65 years old

23. Employment status:

| $\square$ | Employee | $\square$ | Self-employed |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\square$ | Retired | $\square$ | Others (please specify)__ |

24. Your average monthly income (including salaries, interest, rent and other earnings):

- Below HK\$5,000
- HK\$5,000 -HK\$9,999
- HK\$10,000 - HK\$14,999
- HK\$15,000 - HK\$19,999
- HK\$20,000 - HK\$24,999
- HK\$25,000 - HK\$29,999
- HK\$30,000 - HK\$49,999
- HK\$50,000 or above

Thank you very much for taking your valuable time to complete this questionnaire!

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[^0]:    1 The "through train" program was different from the QDII scheme. The news of the program surfaced on 20 August 2007.

[^1]:    2 Details see Chen Jengfang, Huang Chunghuey, Wang MingLong, and Cheng Jia-Chi (2010)
    3 Lehman mini bond is a type of derivative, which is called credit default swap.

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[^3]:    4 The buoyant stock market was limited to the bull market between January 2006 and the end of October 2007 when the market reached its peak.
    5 Prospect theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman, professor at Princeton University's Department of Psychology, and AmoTversky in 1979 as a psychologically realistic alternative to expected utility theory. In 2002 Daniel Kahneman shared the Nobel Prize in Economics but unfortunately

[^4]:    6 Such as rewording of some questions to eliminate ambiguities, and adding or expanding the income classes so as to capture more information.
    See Cochran, Mosteller, and Tukey (1954).
    8 For details, refer Johnsson, Lindblom and Platan, (2002)

[^5]:    9 The mean is calculated by: $\$ 17,462,500 / 1,199=\$ 14,564.22$
    10 The median is calculated by: $\$ 10,000+\left\{\left[\left(\frac{1,199+1}{2}\right)-\right.\right.$
    $491] / 268\} \times \$ 5,000=\$ 12,033.58$

